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Breaking Even: 
Political Economy and Private Enterprise in the Norwegian Glass Industry, 
1739-1803 
Rolv Petter Amdam, Robert Fredona, and Sophus A. Reinert  1
 
With the notable exception of the company until very recently known as Statoil, now 
Equinor, there have been few businesses more iconic in Norwegian history than Christiania 
Glasmagasin, which today produces fine glass from Hadeland and porcelain from Porsgrund. 
Though it enjoys a major online presence and at least 45 outlets throughout the country, from 
Mandal in the south to Harstad in the north, the name remains almost uniquely identified with 
its majestic former emporium, finalized with fine-grained gray-white Iddefjord granite in 
1899, on the square in front of the Oslo Cathedral. The store originated as a 1776 outlet for 
Norwegian glassworks, themselves direct descendant of the Royal Norwegian Chartered 
Company established on 21 May 1739. The business has, of course, undergone remarkable 
transformations during its nearly 300 years of continuous existence, but its core focus on pro-
ducing glass has remained clear, and, appropriately, offers a unique lens for analyzing the re-
lationship between public policy and private initiative at the origins of Norwegian industrial-
ization; and, more broadly, between the often divergent historiographical perspectives offered 
by business history, the history of capitalism, and the history of political economy.  2
More specifically, this paper considers the companyÕs founding, growth, and man-
agement in the nexus of economic theory, public policy, private investment, international em-
 The following draws on and develops work by Rolv Petter Amdam originally published in the chapters he con1 -
tributed to Rolv Petter Amdam, Tore J¿rgen Hanisch, and Ingvild Pharo, Vel blst! Christiania Glasmagasin og 
norsk glassindustri 1739-1989 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1989). Robert FredonaÕs research was supported by a grant 
from the European UnionÕs Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-
Curie grant agreement No. 793583. The authors are grateful to Walter Friedman, Geoffrey Jones, and three 
anonymous reviewers for suggestions and constructive critiques. We also thank the cartographer Isabelle Lewis 
for expertly drawing the two maps, and Mathew W. Norris, Executive Director of Analytics at the Art Institute 
of Chicago, for designing the charts. 
 On the Norwegian glass industry, and Christiania Glasmagasin in particular, see generally Amdam, Hanisch, 2
and Pharo, Vel blst! and, for a short pamphlet, Jens W. Berg, Kortfattet historie om glassproduksjonen i Norge 
(Jevnaker: Hadeland glassverk, 1992).
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ulation, and environmental constraints characterizing eighteenth-century Denmark-Norway. 
And then it addresses the surprising fact that the firm operated at a yearly loss from the very 
beginning to 1787, a period of almost 50 years. From the perspective of state capitalism, 
there are many reasons why it might make long-term sense to support unprofitable activities 
in order to nurture strategic industries, but why were private investors so patient over such a 
long period?  And what does this tell us about public-private partnerships and, more general3 -
ly, the political economy of development in Enlightenment Norway? In addressing these 
questions, we begin to respond to the important call for more business historical research on 
the role and perception of profitability in the history of capitalism.  We will argue that in4 -
vestors enduredÑthough not without voicing frustrationsÑtheir losses for so long for a 
number of reasons, including the hopes that a monopoly eventually might be granted the 
company for the sale of glass in Denmark-Norway once it had proven it could meet the entire 
domestic demand for all kinds of relevant products. Another deciding factor was the preva-
lence of patriotic sentiments informing the need to establish industries in Norway at a time 
when the world was perceived to be divided between leading countries that exported manu-
factured goods on the one hand, and colonial polities focused on raw materials on the other. 
Investors, finally, were further able to bear sustained losses in the industry because, though 
large in absolute terms, they were nonetheless dwarfed by the vast profits generated by their 
share in the contemporary timber trade. Given these underlying explanations for investor pa-
tience, we will demonstrate how a changing political and intellectual climate in NorwayÑ
informed also by the first ever translation of Adam SmithÕs 1776 Wealth of NationsÑled to 
shifting constellations of regulatory measures and ownership structures in the countryÕs 
glassworks that eventually allowed the company to break even in 1787 and, in the early nine-
teenth century, to become an icon of the countryÕs early industrialization. 
 See, for example, the case of Statoil in Mark C. Thurber and Benedicte Tangen Istad, ÒNorwayÕs Evolving 3
Champion: Statoil and the Politics of State Enterprise,Ó in David G. Victor, David R. Hults, and Mark Thurber 
(eds.), Oil and Governance: State-Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 599-654, pp. 601-2.
 Mary OÕSullivan, ÒThe Intelligent WomanÕs Guide to Capitalism,Ó Enterprise and Society 19.4 (2018): 4
751-802, especially 786-95.
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Nature and Nurture 
 ÒThe Norwegian CompanyÓ was originally granted the privilege to exploit the countryÕs 
enormous natural forest resource wealth in new ways and, more specifically, to transform its 
abundant raw materials into glass, furniture, weapons, charcoal, tar, and other manufactured 
goods that were not yet produced in the country.  This was a local expression of a broader 5
movement of political economy observable throughout the European world often identified 
with terms such as Òmercantilism,Ó ÒColbertism,Ó and ÒCameralism.Ó Though specific mani-
festations of this policy orientation were endlessly varied, it remains that early modern Eu-
ropean writers and legislators on economic matters had increasingly come to emphasize the 
need for import substitution and export-led growth. As far as possible, legions of writers ar-
gued, and policy-makers established, countries should seek to refine and utilize their raw ma-
terials domestically. This because productivity gains in manufacturing allowed for greater 
domestic value addition and thus greater wealth creation in a world of competing states 
among which comparative power was progressively a reflection of relative prosperity.  In 6
Denmark-Norway, this orientation of political economy (at the time identified explicitly with 
the originally Germanic tradition of Cameralism) gained new momentum as a result of the 
hard times that followed in the wake of the Great Northern War of 1700-1721.   7
According to Kommersekollegiet, or the Board of Trade, the governmental unit in 
charge of the economic policy and development of the Kingdom of Denmark-Norway, the 
 This ÒprivilegeÓ is printed in G.E. Christiansen, De gamle privilegerte norske glassverker og Christiania 5
Glasmagasin, 3 vols. (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1939), vol. I, pp. 11-20.
 The literature on these traditions is huge and growing, but see, among others, Lars Magnusson, The Political 6
Economy of Mercantilism (London: Routledge, 2015); Philippe Minard, La fortune du colbertisme: tat et in-
dustrie dans la France des lumires (Paris: Fayard, 1998); Andre Wakefield, The Disordered Police State: Ger-
man Cameralism  as Science and Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Sophus A. Reinert, 
ÒRivalry: Greatness in Early Modern Political Economy,Ó in Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind (eds.), Mercan-
tilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and its Empire (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), pp. 248-270. On the translation of emulation of such theories and practices around the European 
world, see Sophus A. Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). For the commercial world out of which this tradition first 
emerged, see Robert Fredona and Sophus A. Reinert, ÒMerchants and the Origins of Capitalism,Ó in  
in Teresa da Silva Lopes, Christina Lubinski, and Heidi J.S. Tworek, eds., The Routledge Companion to the 
Makers of Global Business (Abingdon, Oxfordshire; and New York: Routledge, forthcoming 2019).
 Amdam, Hanisch, and Pharo, Vel blst!, p. 10; Kristof Glamann, ÒEt kameralistisk programskrift: Uforgri7 -
belige tanker om kommerciens tilstand of opkomstÕ, in Kristof Glamann and Erik Oxenb¿ll (Eds.), Studier i 
dansk merkantilisme: Omkring tekster af Otto Thott (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1977), 11-77, particularly 
p. 24 and onward. On the war, see Peter Ullgren, Det stora nordiska kriget 1700-1721: en berttelse om stor-
makten Sveriges fall (Stockholm: Prisma, 2008).
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new economic policy in favor of domestic manufacturing should be supported by Òpowerful 
means,Ó for, in the face of more mature international competition, industrial activities would 
by necessity Òperish,Ó without active state support.  This movement was particularly spear8 -
headed by the Danish Cameralist and bibliophile Otto Thott, who envisioned Denmark-Nor-
way as an integrated economy in which flat and fertile Denmark would be the breadbasket, 
while Norway, where ÒClimate and Nature themselves struggle against agriculture,Ó would 
focus on the ocean, timber, and minerals.  In line with the major contemporary writers on po9 -
litical economy in Europe, Thott warned against the example of Spain, weak and destitute 
amidst all the abundant mineral riches of the New World, and chided Norway, with all its 
natural riches including ÒfisheriesÉ the gold mine of the North,Ó for still having to import 
Òeven the most ordinary things.Ó  In order to secure employment, independence, and wealth 10
and therefore relative power in international relations, Denmark-Norway would have to in-
creasingly add value to its raw materials domestically. To do this, Ògood MastersÓ should be 
invited to ÒteachÓ their skills to Òlocals,Ó so that, Òwith time,Ó they might spread around the 
country, and an array of policies should be implemented to encourage the development of 
domestic manufacturing, from credit facilitation to outright prohibitions against competing 
foreign goods.  The importation of glass, in particular, had Òbrought a great deal of money 11
out of the country, particularly after the fire in Copenhagen,Ó a reference to the great 1728 
fire in the Danish capital, with reconstructions still ongoing in 1735.  Given the inputs and 12
resources necessary for a glass industry to flourish, however, Thott suggested that Òthere must 
be places that exist in Norway, where forests can be beneficially employedÓ for that 
purpose.   13
  Forest. No. 65/July 4, 1737, KKf8
 Otto Thott, ÒAllerunderdanigste uforgribelige tanker om commerciens telstand og opkomst [1735],Ó in 9
Glamann and Oxenb¿ll (eds.), Studier, 169-216, p. 184. On the role of nature in Norwegian political economy 
during the Enlightenment, see also Sophus A. Reinert, ÒEven Hammer: Politisk ¿konomi i den norske op-
plysningstiden,Ó in rbok 2017 (Molde: Romsdalsmuseet, 2017), pp. 8-39.
 Thott, Óuforgribelige tanker,Ó pp. 171, 182, 185.10
 Thott, Óuforgribelige tanker,Ó p. 189.11
 Thott, Óuforgribelige tanker,Ó p. 192. On the fire, see Kre Lauring, Byen br¾nder: Den store brand i K¿ben12 -
havn 1728 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2003).
 Thott, Óuforgribelige tanker,Ó p. 192.13
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The company established to undertake these developments was originally owned by 
King Christian VI of the House of Oldenburg (1699-1746) and his family with 100 shares, 
Danish and German private investors with 771 shares, and a small group of Norwegians with 
eight shares.  There were many terms for describing such investors in Scandinavia at the 14
time, but most Norwegians would have made their fortunes as merchants or in the mining, 
fishing, and particularly timber sectors, at a time when northern forests essentially supplied 
the Dutch and British fleets with their most crucial raw materials.  These leading Norwegian 15
businesspeople were known as Òpatricians,Ó or more colloquially and jokingly Òplank nobili-
tyÓ and, eventually, simply Òcapitalists.Ó  As Christen Henriksen Pram explained in 1811 16
Under the denomination of Capitalists [Kapitalister] or Rentiers [Rentenerer], the last census 
gives a number of 650 families with 5607 individuals in both Kingdoms [of Denmark-Norway], 
but these are far from the only ones who own capital, who largely belong to other classes of peo-
ple [Folkeklasser], as few wealthy people are only wealthy peopleÉ Neither do they form their 
own class of humans [Menneskeklasse].  17
Compared to limited liability companies, the partnership constituting ÒThe Norwegian Com-
pany,Ó or simply Òthe company,Ó was different in that each investor or ÒownerÓ was personal-
ly responsible for the companyÕs activities, including any potential losses, in full.  In the 18
1740s, and in line with its broad initial spectrum of privileges, the company initiated a num-
ber of activities, including the production of charcoal, tar, resin, potash, sodium nitrate, and 
 A list of all shareholders is printed in Christiansen, De gamle privilegerte norske glassverker, pp. 57-6014
 The classic work on the subject remains Stein Tveite, Engelsk-norsk trelasthandel 1640-1710 (Bergen: Uni15 -
versitetsforlaget, 1961). For an example of the longevity of this trade in global context, see Anne K. Bang, Zanz-
ibar-Olsen: Norsk trelasthandel i ¯st-Afrika 1895-1925 (Oslo: Fagbokforlaget, 2008).
 On this Òclass,Ó see the essays in John Peter Collett and Brd Frydenlund (eds.), Christianias handelspatrisi16 -
at: En elite i 1700-tallets Norge (Oslo: Andresen & Butensch¿n, 2008), and Kari Telste, ÒVisittstuen som speil-
bilde av global handel? Handelspatrisiat, selskapsliv og forbruk i Christiania omkring 1760,Ó Heimen, vol. 46, 
no. 4 (2009), pp. 317-328, 367. See also Erling Rimehaug, ÒTrelastpatrisiatet og den ¿konomiske politikk i 
merkantilismens siste periode: en unders¿kelse av pengepolitikkens virkninger for norsk trelasteksport 
1760-1806,Ó Dissertation in the Department of History, University of Oslo, 1975. For an analysis of the phe-
nomenon in a later period, see Knut Sogner, with Sverre A Christensen, Plankeadel: Kj¾r- og Solbergfamilien 
under den 2. industrielle revolusjon (Oslo: Dreyer, 2001). 
 Christen Henriksen Pram, Tale paa Kongens Fdselsdags-Hitid 1811 med oplysende Anm¾rkninger (Copen17 -
hagen: Seidelin [1811]), p. 37.
 On the earlier history of limited liability companies, see Maurice Carmona, ÒAspects du capitalisme toscan 18
aux XVIe et XVIIe sicles: Les socits en commandite  Florence et  Lucques,Ó Revue dÕhistoire moderne et 
contemporaine 11, no. 2 (1964): 81-108.
"6
bricks. It even operated an iron mine.  The company had at first been awarded a royal privi19 -
lege to be the only producer of all kinds of glass, first in Norway and then also for the whole 
Kingdom of Denmark-Norway, but this industry initially represented only a minor part of its 
activities.  The founding document described the companyÕs mission in terms similar to 20
those employed by Thott: Òto allow the Company to establish Glassworks in the furthest dis-
tant Forests, from where Timber otherwise can be brought, or otherwise turned into 
money.Ó  The glass industry was explicitly championed as a means of valorizing NorwayÕs 21
natural resources, and particularly its vast forests. Attempts had repeatedly been made to es-
tablish a glass industry in Denmark in the pastÑaround 1570, 1650, and 1690Ñbut they had 
always failed for lack of a sustainable source of fuel. NorwayÕs massive timber resources 
were seen as a solution to this problem, and, just as abundant hydropower would facilitate the 
countryÕs proper industrialization in the nineteenth century, so proximity to strategic raw ma-
terials justified the establishment of glassworks there in the eyes of the Danish government 
and of private investors alike.  Indeed, as the companyÕs first director would write in a 1760 22
letter, at a time when numerous glassworks had been forced to close down across Europe for 
lack of access to fuel, in some places in Norway ÒForests are so abundant that 20 glassworks 
cannot consume them in infinite time.Ó  But glass manufacturing at the time required more 23
than just fuel; it required sand and either potash, or potassium carbonate derived from boiling 
ash, or sodium from kelp ash, all of which also were in abundant supply in Norway.  As a 24
result, Norway saw two new glassworks opened in the 1740s. The first one was the N¿stetan-
gen glassworks in Hokksund, near Drammen (1741-1778), which was established to produce 
small amounts of various types of green glass. Later, in the 1750s, it developed to become a 
 Christiansen, De gamle privilegerte norske glassverker, pp. 51-419
 Christiansen, De gamle privilegerte norske glassverker, 1.20
 Reproduced in Amdam, Hanisch, and Pharo, Vel blst!, p. 11.21
 Amdam, Hanisch, and Pharo, Vel blst!, p. 11.22
 Caspar Herman von Storm to Morten W¾rn, 19 August 1760, PA 1,23
 Amdam, Hanisch, and Pharo, Vel blst!, p. 16.24
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premier producer of fine crystal glass and other luxury products such as chandeliers.  Aas 25
Green Glassworks (1748-1765) was set up a few years later to produce bottles and other 
green glass in Sandsv¾r, near the old mining center of Kongsberg. Each glassworks em-
ployed 25-30 workers, blowing glass 12 hours a day for five days a week.   26
While the country was richly supplied with the necessary raw materials for glass pro-
duction, though, technical know-how was sorely lacking in Denmark-Norway. The company 
therefore immediately embarked on a project of explicit emulation by engaging with Eu-
ropean technical literature on glassmaking, attractingÑas Thott had suggestedÑskilled 
workers from the continent, and even pursuing industrial espionage (which got one Norwe-
gian envoy, the companyÕs future director Morten W¾rn, arrested for a month in London); 
precisely the sort of diffusion of knowledge and expertise that historical centers of glass-mak-
ing from Venice to England long had sought to prohibit.  At the same time, many skilled 27
workers made their way to Norway from the continent looking for jobs on their own accord 
as well, and emulation was manifestly both a top-down and a bottom-up process at the time.  28
 In addition to Amdam, Hanisch, and Pharo, Vel blst!, see also Lynn F. Johansen, Glass p Hokksund f¿r og 25
n ([Hokksund]: N¿stetangen glass, 1998); Ada Polak, Gammelt norsk glass (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1953); and Ran-
di Gaustad, Skl for Norge! N¿stetangens spennende billedverden (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1998).
 On the silver mines at Kongsberg, see Odd Arne Helleberg, Kongsberg s¿lvverk 1623-1958: Kongens ¿yen26 -
stenÑrikenes pryd (Kongsberg: I samarbeid med S¿lvverkets venner, 2000).
 On the German experts who first were brought to Norway for these purposes, see Amdam, Hanisch, and 27
Pharo, Vel blst!, p. 10, and, for the industrial espionage, p. 18-19. For the Danish governmentÕs involvement in 
releasing the spy Morten W¾rn from his London jail, see Caspar Herman von Storm to Adam Gottlob Moltke, 9 
August 1755, PA 1. More broadly, on foreign workers in the industry in Norway, see also Anne Minken, In-
nvandrere ved norske glassverk og etterkommerne deres (1741-1865): en unders¿kelse av etnisk identitet (Oslo: 
Norges Forskningsrd, 2002). On industrial espionage at the time, see J. R. Harris, Industrial Espionage and 
Technology Transfer: Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century (London: Routledge, 2017) and, for the 
Norwegian case, Rolv Petter Amdam, ÒIndustrial Espionage and the Transfer of Technology to the Early Nor-
wegian Glass Industry,Ó in Kristine Bruland (ed.), Technology Transfer and Scandinavian Industrialization 
(New York: Berg, 1991), pp. 73-94. On Venetian prohibitions, see Francesca Trivellato, Fondamenta dei vetrai: 
lavoro, tecnologia e mercato a Venezia tra Sei e Settecento (Rome: Donzelli, 2000), p. 37. On these dynamics of 
emulation, see also Reinert, Translating Empire and Maria Fusaro, Political Economies of Empire in the Early 
Modern Meditarranean: The Decline of Venice and the Rise of England, 1450-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), p. 298. The flow of technology of course went all ways. See, for the example of Venice, 
Roberto Berveglieri, Inventori stranieri a Venezia, 1474-1788: Importazione di tecnologia e circolazione di tec-
nici artigiani inventori (Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 1995).
 Caspar Herman von Storm to Christensen, postmaster in Helsing¿r, 6 October 1753, Copy book, PA 1.28
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Though his name is lost to time, the first Òglass masterÓ to arrive in Norway hailed from 
Thuringia and came to set up shop at N¿stetangen in the early 1740s.   29
 
IMAGE 2: CAPTION/SOURC 
 Gaustad, Skl for Norge!, p. 26-54 and passim. Scandinavians were well aware of classics of glassmaking 29
such as Antonio NeriÕs LÕarte vetraia (Florence: Giunti, 1612), see, for example, Samuel Schultze, Tal om glas-
makeriet (Stockholm: Salvius, 1762), pp. 7-8. 
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Even with access to foreign expertise, abundant raw materials, and active governmen-
tal support, however, the first years of the companyÕs history were far from profitable. The 
original partnership sold the company to a new group of investors during the winter of 1750-
1751, who subsequently reestablished it under new management. And though it remained a 
private-public partnership, the number of shareholders was markedly reduced. King Fredrik 
V (1723-1766) held 30 percent of the shares, and his close friend, advisor, and soon Director 
of the Danish East India Company Count Adam Gottlob Molkte had 10 percent. The remain-
ing shares were owned by private investors, including three Norwegians and the firm Anker 
& W¾rn, representing two of the wealthiest families in Scandinavia. The new director was 
Caspar Herman von Storm, a Norwegian military officer and book collector who had studied 
abroad, and who also became the governor (ÒAmtsmannÓ) of Akershus county in 1757 and 
eventually superior governor of six counties in eastern Norway (ÒAkershus stiftamtÓ) from 
1763.  30
Market Segmentation and the Challenge of Solvency 
Storm and the new owners had a strong vision for the future of the glass sector, and initiated 
a plan to develop the industry so it would cover the demand of all types of glass for the Dan-
ish-Norwegian market. This new strategy revised the original 1739 plan entirely. Rather than 
ambitiously seeking to develop a large number of disparate industries related to NorwayÕs 
natural resources, the company now focused its efforts solely on glass. From the very begin-
ning, the company had served a very small, high-end market in this space. The king and his 
court represented the most important market for the glassworks, and, as late as in the 1750s, 
the royal wine cellar in Copenhagen was the largest single customer of the Norwegian glass-
works, purchasing around 1/3 of the total production.  After the reconstruction, however, the 31
general assembly stated in 1753 that is primary aim now was to serve all segments of the 
Danish-Norwegian market, and all social classes, with a much broader variety of glass prod-
 Amdam, Hanisch, and Pharo, Vel blst!, p. 13.30
 Ledger 1751-60, PA1, no. 3.31
"10
ucts.  This basic idea found its practical expression in a bold plan to expand the industry by 32
investing in new glassworks. 
 Minutes from the board of management June 19, 1753, MoltkeÕs archive, no 2132
"11
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PLACEHOLDER MAP
This plan included a new glassworks in Hurdal (1756) for the production of crown 
glass, which was window glass of high quality based on English and French technology ac-
quired by explicit industrial espionage and produced by glassworkers from the two 
countries.  It also included a new glassworks in Biri (1766) for the production of cylinder 33
glass (ÒfensterglassÓ), which was window glass of cruder technology produced mainly by 
glassworkers from Bohemia. In 1762, a glassworks in Hadeland was established for the pro-
duction of bottles and other green glass in order to replace the now closed-down glassworks 
at Aas. All of these glassworks were located within a radius of less than 150 km from Chris-
tiania, which became Kristiania in 1877 and, eventually, Oslo in 1925 (the original name the 
city had enjoyed from its medieval founding until the great fire of 1624).  Later in the 18th 34
century, the company set up two further glassworks for window panes, one in Hurum (known 
as Taxmaster SchimmelmannÕs glassworks from 1779) for the production of bottles and one 
in Jevne, in Fberg near Lillehammer (1792), for the production of Òtaffelglass,Ó which was 
window glass of higher quality than Òfensterglass,Ó but lower than crown glass. What follows 
focuses primarily on the glass industry from the 1751 reconstruction to the end of the 18th 
century, when the frequently interventionist ideals of Cameralism gave way to more market-
based solutions as guiding principles for the development and operation of the company. Par-
ticularly, it will seek to relate the changing political economy of the period to actual business 
practices at the time. 
Given eighteenth-century accounting norms, it is actually something of a puzzle to 
uncover a companyÕs real annual profits and losses. What we do know is that the company 
technically went bankrupt in 1751, after 12 years of operation, and that the reconstructed 
company continued to lose money. To cover these losses, individual investors had to pay in 
proportion to the number of shares that they held. Such personal outlays had to be borne re-
peatedly, not only to cover running losses but also to invest in new glassworks. And this situ-
ation led to debates among shareholders and stakeholders in the glass industry, both public 
and private, about how to better organize the company to turn the situation around and begin 
making profits. They discussed different organizational alternatives as well as different own-
 Caspar Herman von Storm to Morten W¾rn, 5 July 1754, Copy book, PA 1. 33
 For an overview of the history of the city, see Synn¿ve Veinan Hellerud and Jan Messel, Oslo: A Thousand-34
Year History (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2000).
"13
ership structures, and their debates reveal differentÑand changingÑviews on the role of the 
state in developing new industries in eighteenth-century political economy. 
"14
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In addition to the necessity of additional large investments for setting up new glass-
works, the reconstructed firm also continued to suffer from cash flow problems and from 
structural difficulties  inherent to the business itself. In order to serve the Dano-Norwegian 
market, for example, the company established warehouses in Copenhagen, in Denmark, and 
in Christiania and Drammen, in Norway.  In effect, a major challenge to the companyÕs prof35 -
itability, and one that would repeatedly cause its shareholders concern, related to its logistics 
at a time of still limited territorial marketization.  Most of the products were shipped 36
100-150 kilometers from the different glassworks out to the coast. Given the condition of in-
frastructure at the time, and particularly roads, transportation was easier during winter, when 
ice and snow covers both increased speed and reduced breakages, than during summer. The 
company calculated that five percent of all shipments broke in wintertime, compared to 12-20 
percent during the snow-free months. In addition, the farmers who transported the finished 
glass products over land received lower wages in winter than in summer, when they had more 
to do. The Norwegian investor Carsten Anker, a member of the timber patriciate and future 
director of the Danish East India Company as well as one of NorwayÕs Founding Fathers, in-
vestigated this personally, finding that farmers demanded 6 rigsdaler (Rd) to transport 100 
bottles from Hadeland to Christiania in summertime, compared to only 2 Rd during winter.  37
Once it had arrived safely to the coast, most of the glass was then shipped by sea from the 
ports of Drammen or Christiania to the warehouse in Copenhagen. While logistics by land 
were simpler during the winter months than during summer, however, the inverse was true at 
sea. Indeed, because of icing on the Oslo Fjord, the companyÕs glass had to be stored in a 
warehouse in port until the March melting before it could be shipped to Copenhagen. 
 Amdam, Hanisch, and Pharo, Vel blst!, chapter 1.35
 For perspectives on this challenge in contemporary Europe, see Sophus A. Reinert, The Academy of 36
Fisticuffs: Political Economy and Commercial Society in Enlightenment Italy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
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Transportation was thus costly and seasonally uneven, and the companyÕs logistical 
bottlenecks caused severe problems, particularly, in some periods from the late 1770s on-
ward, when the Norwegian glassworks experienced booms in demand. The organizational 
structure of having several glassworks and several warehouses had consequences also for the 
companyÕs accounting practices and the consequent perception of profits and losses. From the 
main reports in the ledger, one could get the impression that the company was always prof-
itable, since all the glass the company shipped from its glassworks toward its warehouses was 
defined and recorded as income at the expected price.  These reports said nothing about 38
whether glass was broken during transport, or whether the warehouses in the end were able to 
sell any of it. Since most of the output from the glassworks produced in the 1750s and 1760s 
was not sold at all, there is a massive disparity between the balance presented in the compa-
nyÕs central ledger and its actual financial situation. In order to get an overview of the com-
panyÕs actual financial condition, we have therefore reconstructed a more complete picture of 
its real profits and losses by going through the day-to-day records of its warehouses and 
comparing, on an annual basis, the income from its actual market sales with the expenses that 
the glassworks reported. See Chart 1. Though we do know that a minor part of the production 
was sold directly from the glassworks to local markets in rural Norway, and thus not reported 
as sales-income through the warehouses, it is nonetheless evident that the operation never 
became profitable during the period under analysis. Because of the nature of the companyÕs 
incorporation, and particularly its unlimited liability, this led to severe and ongoing yearly 
losses for shareholders.  
 
 Ledger, 1751-60, 1767-73, PA 1, no. 338
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PLACEHOLDER CHART
Before the reconstruction, the companyÕs first owners had invested a total of 56,000 
Rd in stocks, which they lost when a new partnership bought the company in 1751. In addi-
tion, the companyÕs debts at that time totaled 23,800 Rd. The contemporary Danish-Norwe-
gian monetary systemÑdivided between debased and sometimes banknote courants on the 
one hand, and hard specie on the otherÑhailed from 1713, though its basic currency structure 
dated back to the Renaissance (12 penning = 1 skilling; 16 skilling = 1 mark; 6 mark = 1 
rigsdaler, or Rd). The rigsdaler contained 4/37ths of the silver content of a Cologne mark, or 
25.28 grams of silver. For comparison, an urban male laborer in Copenhagen made about 3 
marks a day, or half a rigsdaler.  The new owners paid 10,000 Rd for the company, and its 39
remaining debt at the time was covered through a lottery in Denmark.  The new agreement 40
stipulated that investors would remain jointly liable for the entirety of the companyÕs debts. 
Furthermore, according to its by-laws, the companyÕs General Assembly, where one vote rep-
resented one share, could decide with Òsimple majorityÓ that all shareholders had to con-
tribute to cover the annual losses. If anyone refused, management was entitled to sell their 
respective shares at a public auction.  41
This agreement had major consequences for the shareholders. Between 1752 and 
1771, the companyÕs investors on average paid more than 12,000 Rd annually to cover 
losses.  The main reason for these losses was simply that the company failed to sell its prod42 -
ucts. In the 1750s, real income from sales represented 0-17 % of total production costs. In 
1760, production costs were more than 22,000 Rd, while income from sales did not reach 
3,500 Rd. As late as 1769, production costs were ca. 61,000 Rd, and income from sales only 
around 21,000 Rd. The value of the products stored in the companyÕs warehouses was around 
200,000 Rd, three entire yearsÕ worth of output from the Norwegian glassworks, representing 
two thirds of the customs revenues from Sound Dues in ¯resund levied on all foreign ships 
crossing the line between Helsing¿r and Helsingborg separating the North Sea from the 
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Baltic, one of the most important sources of Danish crown revenue.  The new and expansive 43
state-led economic policy from the 1730s had assumed that new industrial activities would 
create their own demand. This did not happen as expected, however, and the state found itself 
forced to directly subsidize a number of the industries whose establishment it had encour-
aged.  In the case of the Norwegian glass industry, the king paid 35.5 % of the costs neces44 -
sary to keep the company running from 1739 to 1776.  As such, private investors bore the 45
brunt of the costs of keeping the company solvent and operational in the initial decades of 
sustained losses.  
Some scholars have argued that a dearth of private capital was the main constraint for 
the development of industrial activities in Norway in this period.  This, however, does not 46
seem to have been the case in the glass industry. On the contrary, the company expanded and 
established a number of new glassworks to enable the manufacture of a great variety of glass 
products precisely because private investors were willing to finance sustained losses. Year 
after year, decade after decade, they covered losses when management asked them to. Even-
tually, however, by the late 1760s, investors began to prove less willing to comply, and 
AnkerÕs cousin James Collett and other members of the Christiania timber-patriciate gave the 
company loans which later had to be repaid by the shareholders.  Earlier scholarship has 47
claimed that the companyÕs investors simply were not motivated by profit, but that they rather 
contributed to the industrialization of Norway out of a sense of idealism or patriotism.  48
Though the investorÕs motivations doubtlessly were multifaceted and complex, the compa-
nyÕs archives nonetheless demonstrate the degree to which both management and investors 
indeed searched for profitability for decades. In 1753, for example, the general manager 
Storm optimistically wrote that if they could only manage to recruit more skilled foreign 
 Ibid. On the ¯resund dues, see Erik G¿bel, Ò¯resundstolden og dens regnskaber 1497-1857,Ó rbog 2010 43
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workers, the company could Òannually expect more than 1,000 Rd in profit.Ó  Similarly, 49
economic arguments were frequently the main consideration for why the company ought not 
make any new investments or operational changes, such as replacing local wood with import-
ed coal as the main energy source for the glassworks.   50
Since the company had difficulties in selling its products, one might ask why man-
agement did not try to reduce prices in order to render their goods more competitive. Varia-
tions of this question were addressed broadly in contemporary economic debates in Den-
mark-Norway.  Even with a six percent tariff on imported glass, Norwegian substitutes were 51
more expensive than foreign imports, and Storm believed a tariff of no less than 40 percent 
would be necessary to render them competitive.  Through the 1750s, he in effect argued that 52
Norwegian glass should be more expensive due to higher local labor costs.  Indeed, wages 53
seem to have absorbed a higher percentage of operating costs in Norwegian glassworks than 
in comparative establishments in Continental Europe. See Chart 2. As eventually would be-
come clear, however, structurally high production costs were a consequence of the spirit of 
emulation in which the company had been founded. As Morten W¾rn wrote in 1772, the 
costs of production in the company depended entirely on the high wages that initially had 
been promised foreign workers to convince them to move to rural Norway, and could not be 
mitigated Òuntil the now remaining foreign workers have passed away.Ó  This was why the 54
company eventually invested, without additional state support, in apprenticeship programs 
and, importantly, permanent vocational schools in several locations from the mid-to-late 
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1770s, teaching not only glassmaking but also mathematics, reading, writing, and religion. 
With some state support, the company even helped initiate a pension fund for workers.  55
 Amdam, Hanisch, and Pharo, Vel blst!, p. 35. For context on the early period of the welfare state, see Anne-55
Lise Seip, Sosialhjelpstaten blir til: Norsk sosialpolitikk 1740-1920 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1984), particularly pp. 
34-51.
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PLACEHOLDER CHART
One reason why the companyÕs management did not worry unduly about prices was 
that they explicitly expected the king to ban all glass imports to Denmark-Norway once the 
Norwegian glassworks had reached sufficient capacity to satisfy domestic demand in the two 
Kingdoms. Such a ban would also eliminate competition from foreign glassworks that had 
established a presence in the region before the Norwegian producers came online. For in-
stance, representatives from companies in Bohemia had travelled around in Denmark already 
in the seventeenth century to sell glass, and had even established warehouses in 
Copenhagen.  As late as in 1752, a Norwegian merchant was granted a royal privilege to sell 56
German glass in the cathedral city of Trondheim.  As such, in addition to the more civiliza57 -
tional mission in which the investors were involved, they were also motivated by the expecta-
tion of future protection to continue production in the face of ongoing losses. And they had 
good reason to believe that such a restriction would eventually be introduced. A number of 
other products, including refined sugar, were protected by just such an import ban. In 1762, 
more than 130 products were banned from import to Denmark and more than 30 to both 
Denmark and Norway.   As mentioned, the precondition for being protected by an import 58
ban was that the industry proved itself productive enough to meet Denmark-NorwayÕs total 
demand. Only then might a ban on imports in the sector in question be considered.  And the 59
domestic market for glass was growing from the 1750s. Where, previously, only elites had 
used glass drinking vessels, ever larger parts of society now embraced the custom; more wine 
was bottled and drunk by a wider array of people; window panes in houses became larger; 
and glass windows penetrated ever deeper into the countryside. Even farmers began to intro-
duce glass windows in their barns, Òso that the light, that has a great impact on the health of 
the livestock, is let in.Ó  Glass was, as such, quite evidently a growth industry in Denmark-60
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Norway at the time, intimately connected not only to the extension of traditional husbandry 
but crucially to the expansion of consumerism and commercial society there in the second 
half of the eighteenth century.  61
The expansion of the glass industry was implemented according to plan. More than 
discussing prices, what mattered for the company was to build as many glassworks as were 
necessary to produce all kinds of glass, in order to convince the king that they indeed could 
cover the entire market for such goods. For instance, a frequent exchange of letters in the late 
1750s from Storm to Moltke, who represented the king, did not reflect any concerns about 
whether a ban would be decided or not, but focused rather on the progress of the development 
of the glass industry and on when it would be able to meet all domestic demand for glass 
products so that a ban could be implemented.  In numerous letters, Storm also assured in62 -
vestors that the expansion was going well, and that the king would soon be pleased with the 
companyÕs progress and finalize the import ban, thus finally allowing the company to break 
even and then rapidly become profitable.  The kingÕs long-established economic policy with 63
regard to protecting new industries as soon as they had proven that they could meet the de-
mands of the domestic markets thus gave the impression of a credible commitment that creat-
ed expectations for future profit among the investors in Norwegian glassworks. This, in turn, 
facilitated their decision to continue facing losses year after year.  64
Beyond the question of the profitability of the business, merchants in Copenhagen 
complained about the quality of the goods produced by the Norwegian glassworks. This view 
was supported by the custom service that in 1766 stated that too many bottles were Òof too 
poor quality to be transported with wine on long journeysÓ.  Moltke, who, in line with con65 -
temporary principles of governance, was chiefly concerned with the Òcommon goodÓ, noted 
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that while 6,000 bottles were sent to Copenhagen in 1757, the problem was that Òmany bot-
tles were too big, some too small, yes, the design is not accurate.Ó  And Storm claimed that 66
the mismatch between supply and demand was what kept postponing the import ban. He 
therefore sent Morten W¾rn, then a member of the board of managers, to Copenhagen in 
1759 to convince Moltke that Òa proper supply of Norwegian glass would never be lacking in 
Copenhagen.Ó  Many in the imperial capital nonetheless held that the Norwegian glassworks 67
produced too many unmarketable products. At the same time as some glass products were 
stored and not sold, there was a high demand for products that were not stocked in the com-
panyÕs warehouses.  Nonetheless, the much anticipated ban on imports was finally institu68 -
tionalized in 1760, at a time when the Norwegian glassworks were still clearly unable to meet 
domestic demand. This is evident from the fact that the company was allowed to import 1500 
chests with cylinder glass from Pomerania only two months after the ban was established.  69
Indeed, the company, as well as glass masters, wine shops and pharmacies, were, in spite of 
the ban, occasionally allowed to import glass to meet the demand throughout the subsequent 
decade.  70
The company faced a dilemma well-known to the historiography of planned and 
command economies. Unable to single-handedly master the forces of supply and demand, it 
ended up producing too many of some products, and too few of others. Particularly in the 
1750s, when economic policy pushed for the expansion of the glass industry, management 
developed plans to meet the whole spectrum of plausible Danish-Norwegian demand for 
glass. This proved to be easier said than done. Regarding window panes, for example, Storm 
thought that what the market wanted was expensive and high-quality crown class rather than 
what he maintained was lower quality cylinder glass (ÒfensterglassÓ).  On their end, domes71 -
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tic consumers turned out to largely demand German Òfensterglass.Ó And as unsold crown 
glass piled up in the companyÕs warehouses, the government was forced to allow the import 
of German ÒfensterglassÓ to meet demand. Admitting to his mistake, and proverbially reading 
the market better, Storm ultimately decided to invest in a new, dedicated glassworks at Biri, 
near Gj¿vik, to produce ÒfensterglassÓ domestically.  72
As an institution, the monopoly offered the company challenges as well as opportuni-
ties. The obligation to produce all kinds of glass was particularly demanding. Not only did 
the company commit itself to being able to produce all types of glass products, but it also had 
to ensure that the warehouses of all major cities in Denmark-Norway were stocked with the 
full catalogue of goods. Furthermore, the company promised to, in the future, supply Òall 
models and kind of glass that may be invented.Ó  This idea of producing and storing all kind 73
of class at all times was visually expressed in a 1763 catalogue the company commissioned 
from the Danish engraver IP Olufsen Weyse, a hand-colored register illustrating more than 
600 products from small drinking glasses to bottles and window panes.  These were the 74
products that the company promised to produce and store in order to be rewarded the import 
ban. If we consider the logistical challenges the company faced in getting products to markets 
as a result of its geography of operations, not to mention those relating to climate and chang-
ing seasons, this beautiful catalogue exemplified the most important institutional constraint of 
the its monopoly in the period. 
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Resentment and Reform 
Undoubtedly, the governmentÕs policy attracted investments in the glass industry and helped 
keep the dream of profitability alive among investors, despite the yearly losses. As it turned 
out, however, even the 1760 import ban did not inaugurate an era of profits for the company, 
and yet shareholders continued to invest in new glassworks and to cover running losses. In 
the 1760s, however, this could continue because of changing management strategies. While 
investors were asked to cover transparent losses on a yearly basis through the 1750s, share-
holders were only asked to cover the companyÕs yearly losses for the 1760s late in the 
decade.  This because Storm and Jacob Benzon, the new general director after 1767, person75 -
ally provided the capital for some of the investments and all of the losses every year in the 
form of loans to the company. The other shareholders were not aware of the arrangement, and 
eventually complained that the situation had not been discussed in the General Assembly.  76
Investors were finally asked to repay the loans to cover losses for the previous years in 1767, 
when the market expanded and Benzon and the custom service made a critical survey of the 
company, including the conditions at all glassworks. The last relatively large glasswork, in 
Biri, had been inaugurated the previous year, and the commission concluded that the critical 
years were over and that the company finally would be able to meet demand for the most 
popular products moving forward.  This assessment would, however, again prove too opti77 -
mistic, and, as the company continued to fail to break even, investors finally began losing 
confidence. A crisis was at hand.  
While glass production in Norway increased in the 1760s, it dropped again in the ear-
ly 1770s. From a production value of 61,000 Rd in 1769, it fell to 35,000 Rd in 1776.  Sev78 -
eral glassworks had to close or suspend operations, among them the new ÒfensterÓ glass-
works in Biri for most of 1772, and Hadeland for the production of bottles from January 1772 
to June 1776. This was extremely costly, since the company continued to pay the salaries of 
the workers, who were all first-generation immigrants that management feared would leave 
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the country if not paid.  The crisis was partly financial, as it was harder to raise money to 79
cover operational losses, but also organizational. More specifically, management was weak 
during the period, unable to negotiate between different factions regarding how the company 
should be run to achieve profitability. One alternative was to let private investors take over 
the glass industry entirely, letting it sink or swim in accordance with market forces, consumer 
preferences, and simpler economic incentives; another was for the king to increase his shares 
and solidify a state ownership of the company. 
Shares were split in the early 1770s, and in 1771 there were 24 shareholders in addi-
tion to the king.  The two largest private investors were the current manager Jacob Benzon, 80
with 17.5 percent, and the previous manager Storm with 10 percent. According to the by-laws 
of the company, all shareholders had to pay to cover losses or make further investments if the 
General Assembly voted in favor of it. As mentioned, it was, in principle, possible to auction 
off the shares of non-compliant shareholders, but management seems to have thought that it 
was better to work for consensus than to threaten any such auction explicitly. There was, after 
all, a danger that no one would bid on the shares in question, and this would reveal and make 
public the real underlying value of the company. The companyÕs organizational structure and 
regulations were, in other words, poorly suited to raising new capital in cases where the ma-
jority of shareholders were not in favor of it. As mentioned, management had been able, 
though against growing opposition, to convince the companyÕs shareholders to pay the debt 
through the 1760s, but the situation changed around 1770. Shareholders waited ever longer 
after the decision had been made in the General Assembly to pay their debts, and frequently 
complained that management did not listen to the other shareholders.  Votes in the general 81
assembly were no longer unanimous, and, in the face of mounting pressure, Jacob Benzon 
eventually resigned as manager of the company. A new management team, consisting of 
Morten W¾rn, who years earlier had embarked on a journey of industrial espionage for the 
company, and Court Junker Stockflett, were appointed in 1770, but was soon replaced by an-
 Amdam, Hanisch, and Pharo, Vel blst!, p. 27.79
 Christiansen, De gamle privilegerte norske glassverker, pp. 204, 109, 124, 128, 131.80
 Benzon voted on the behalf of the king, and he and Storm controlled the majority of the shares. Newton 81
W¾rn memo June 30, 1776, FA XXI. 11.1.
"31
other team made up of Bailiff S¿ren Hagerup and Chief Magistrate Fredrik Wilhelmsen. This 
latter team would go on to manage the company during subsequent years of crises.  82
In this situation of continuing losses and growing distrust of management, a group of 
Norwegian private investors made a radical offer that represented an alternative model to that 
under which the company had operated since its incorporation. In short, they wished to move 
the focus of the companyÕs strategy from economic self-sufficiency, fully supplying the do-
mestic Danish-Norwegian market with every kind of glass product, to a clearer rationality 
based on profits. The ownership structure could remain, but the individual glassworks would 
be made more independent under leaseholder agreements and given an explicit mandate to be 
profitable. And, crucially, their lessee administrators were to be incentivized by the promise 
of a share of any eventual profits for the company at large. The offer was made in 1770, when 
Kay Brandt offered to lease the glassworks of both Hadeland, of which he was the current 
administrator, and Biri. Brandt had been in the company since 1747 and knew the industry 
well. His offer was accepted, and he was allowed to lease the two glassworks for ten and six 
years respectively. He was not alone in such an undertaking, however, and was indeed one of 
five Norwegian investors who sought to change the business model at the time. Another was 
David Bolt, the manager of Hurdal glasswork, who, similarly, was allowed to lease it with the 
backing of Jacob Benzon, who then had just stepped down as director of the company, and 
two of the richest merchants in Christiania: James Collett, who had provided crucial loans to 
the company in the 1760s, and the forest owner and timber merchant Bernt Anker, at that 
time NorwayÕs wealthiest man.  Through these leases, most of the risk would be transferred 83
from the company to individual investors and entrepreneurs who believed in the industry. Ac-
cording to the contract, the skilled labor force would stay and the royal privilege remain. In 
return, leaseholders had to commit to maintain the glassworks and to keeping them in opera-
tion, as well as paying the company 1,400 Rd annually per glasswork, close to the value of 8 
percent of the companyÕs total shares.  The Norwegian Company remained as a sales organi84 -
zation, and continued to set prices for glass goods at their warehouses. Leaseholders could, 
 Christiansen, De gamle privilegerte norske glassverker, p. 142.82
 Christiansen, De gamle privilegerte norske glassverker, p. 141.83
 Contract, FA XXI, 11.1.84
"32
however, influence their returns by selling directly from the glassworks rather than shipping 
their output to one of the companyÕs warehouses. While the company paid 30 Rd for each 
shipment of 1000 small bottles from Hadeland to Christiania, for example, Brandt was able to 
sell the same bottles for 35 Rd to local customers.  In this vein, he recruited a network of 16 85
agents in Norway and 9 in Denmark to sell straight from the glassworks rather than through 
the central warehouses.  Needless to say, these strategies challenged the governmentÕs origi86 -
nal ambitions for the planning and regulation of the glass industry in fundamental ways. 
Even with his best efforts, however, Kay Bandt did not manage to make the Hadeland 
and Biri glassworks profitable. He proved unable to raise the necessary capital to continue 
operations and, faced with debt and unable to pay his workers, was forced to give up his con-
tract with the company.  David Bolt and his co-investors who had leased the Hurdal glass87 -
works were more successful.  On the one hand, this was because of his much wealthier fi88 -
nanciers, who gladly bankrolled operations of the glasswork; on the other, David Bolt had 
decided to abandon the companyÕs long-held views on prices by cutting them by 25 percent 
in an attempt to increase demand and achieve economies of scale.  Carsten Anker, who at 89
that time represented the governmentÕs interests in the Norwegian glass industry, frowned 
upon BoltÕs new strategy, as it ultimately would benefit the leaseholder as a private individ-
ual. Had the reduction in prices benefitted the company as such, it might have been accept-
able, he opined, but not if it favored an outside leaseholder Òwith no knowledge whatsoever 
of economic and physical matters.Ó   90
And even if Hurdal seemed to perform better than before, its main investor Bernt 
Anker was not happy. His investment had been motivated also by profit, and he had consid-
ered Òthis contract a straightforward lease contract,Ó an investment with a certain possibility 
of profit. Yet, instead of profits, he found an utter mess for which no one in the company was 
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willing to take responsibility. One director, Morten W¾rn, wanted to leave the company, and 
Stockfleth was Òas paralyzed as a dead manÓ. And behind them, Bernt Anker wrote, sat the 
previous manager, Storm, Òwho orchestrates the company.Ó Furthermore, Anker criticized the 
company for not handing over the old stock of glass to the leaseholders, as agreed in the con-
tract.  He eventually lost patience, and, in December 1774, made an offer to acquire the 91
whole company with all glassworks, including the privilege, and its stock of glass for 70,000 
Rd. The offer would imply a complete reorganization of the company and dramatically weak-
en the role of the state in the industry. Eleven shareholders met to discuss the bid at the com-
panyÕs general assembly on December 10, 1774. No one opposed it on principle. Several 
suggested that the bid should be 10,000-30,000 Rd higher. Among them was Kay Brand, but 
he also expressed his thankfulness to Anker for Òthus lifting the interested parties out of this 
interminable aggravationÑwhich had cost him all of his welfare,Ó the chaos, in short, that 
had cost him his fortune.  The Danish-Norwegian tax authority, however, would ultimately 92
have to accept the bid for privatization. Instead of doing so, it offered a counter bid for the 
whole company. On behalf of the king, the government now wished to buy all the shares in 
the company for 400 Rd each, which was 37.5 Rd, or 8.6 percent, lower than AnkerÕs offer. 
The alternative offered those investors who were unwilling to sell was to pay 200 Rd per 
shareÑthat is half the offered share priceÑto finance the continuing operation of the compa-
ny. In the face of such pressure, most private investors decided to sell to the king, and, by 
1776, only Carsten Anker, Nils Tank, and James Collett remained as private owners, the king 
having increased his ownership stake to nearly 82%, or 139 out of 160 shares.  93
One may well ask why the state did not accept Bernt AnkerÕs offer. Principally, as one 
of its representatives explained at the 1776 general assembly, because there was Ògood reason 
to fear that the individualÕs intention only was to realize [sell off] the companyÕs stock of 
glass and then close all the glassworks down.Ó  Pursuing what it understood to be the public 94
rather than private interest, the state maintained that Denmark-Norway benefitted from a 
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glass sector to satisfy internal demand for imports, to provide rural employment, build do-
mestic expertise, and valorize natural resources that otherwise were exported raw. The run-
ning losses of the glassworks were, in this vision, compensated by their positive externalities. 
As Carsten Anker later reflected, the state had acquired the majority of shares in the company 
Òin order to avoid the closure of the company, and to maintain industriousness in the country, 
which was more important to the State than the yearly loss of operations were for the Royal 
Treasury.Ó  95
That said, it is not evident that Bernt Anker and his group of investors had really been 
interested in closing the glassworks down. They had made clear that they disagreed with the 
principle that national considerations should trump profitability, and had, as such, more faith 
in the glass industry than in the governmentÕs management of it. As one of them had argued 
at the 1774 general assembly, the different glassworks would benefit from being organized as 
independent units, Òwhich can be done best by Private Owners.Ó  The private shareholders, 96
in short, regarded the existing organizational form of the company and the industry as a con-
straint hindering profitability, while the government regarded it as a safeguard for the princi-
ple of serving the common interest by making Denmark and Norway self-sufficient with 
glass and promoting industrialization. This was an important theoretical debate in the Eu-
ropean world at the time, which only would intensify in the coming decades, but which in 
this case found practical expression at the intersection economic policy and business practice.  
By the time the investors sold their shares to the king for 400 Rd in 1776, each share 
had, on average, cost them 1580 Rd.  In the aftermath of the royal bid, all of the companyÕs 97
glassworks were put under the management of a new government entity called The Norwe-
gian Manufacturing Administration. In addition to the glassworks, the Manufacturing Admin-
istration also managed other activities such as the cobalt mine and blue color works at Mod-
um, better known as Blaafarvev¾rket, which at its height in the 1830s and 1840s would pro-
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vide no less than 80 percent of all global supply of blue coloring.  Carsten Anker, who still 98
was a private investor, became the director of the glassworks unit within this new organiza-
tion. The acquisition might be seen as symptomatic of the governmentÕs attempts to resist the 
rise of more market-oriented principles of political economy at the time, but, as it were, the 
new government administration itself undertook precisely such measures in its continuing 
quest not only for national strategic interests and the proverbial common good, but also seem-
ingly ever-elusive profitability.  
In this, the governmentÕs approach to political economy was also shaped by a boom in 
the demand for glass that began around the time of the kingÕs nearly complete nationalization 
of the company in 1776. The growth was dramatic, and sales that year were more than five 
times what they had been in 1769. Indeed, demand increased so fast that Norwegian glass-
works were unable to meet it during the boom from 1776 to 1781, and the glass master guild 
in Copenhagen complained about the difficulties in securing enough glass.  The increasing 99
demand was mostly caused by a thriving construction industry, partly in reaction to the disas-
trous explosion of CopenhagenÕs gun powder magazine on March 31, 1779, when a very 
large number of window panes broke throughout the city.  100
 Ingrid Hagen, Blfargen fra Modum: En verdenshistorie; Blaafarvev¾rket 1776-1821 (Oslo: Scandinavian 98
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The complaints arose mostly in Copenhagen, naturally, because Denmark was by far the 
largest market for Norwegian glass. From 1767 to 1773, only 35 percent of the companyÕs 
output was sold in Norway, while three percent was exported to Hamburg, Amsterdam, Riga, 
Danzig and St. Petersburg. The remaining 62 percent was sold in Denmark. Considering the 
longer period 1766-1791, no less than 75 percent of all Norwegian glass was sold in Den-
mark, and, from there, in its colonies. For though Denmark rarely is considered from an im-
perial perspective in the historiography of early modern Europe, it nonetheless enjoyed colo-
nial possessions in Asia, Africa, and the West Indies that influenced its foreign policy, eco-
nomic strategies, and popular culture alike.  Indeed, a significant number of Norwegian 101
glass bottles (as high as 18 percent) was filled with wine for export to the Danish colony in 
Trankebar, India, now Tharangambadi.  Within Norway, Christiania represented the largest 102
share of sales in the period 1767-1773, with 36 percent, followed by Bergen and Trondheim 
(both 13 percent), Drammen (11 percent), Fredrikshald (now Halden) (5 percent), and finally 
other cities (15 percent) and local sales at the glassworks (7 percent).  103
 See, for an overview, Michael Bregnsbo and Kurt Villads Jensen, Det danske imperium: Storhed og fald 101
(Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 2004).
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PLACEHOLDER

The companyÕs failure to meet demand during the boom in the late 1770s precipitated 
a new debate about the import ban. Carsten Anker remained deeply skeptical of the idea of 
opening the Dano-Norwegian market again, as he doubted Norwegian glass would be able to 
compete with foreign imports in terms of both Òquality and price.Ó Rather than letting Òthe 
publicÓ feel the difference, and thus eventually ÒcomplainÓ in the future, he thought it better 
to let it Òavoid the suffering.Ó  The alternative was to expand domestic production by estab104 -
lishing new glassworks. Several alternatives were discussed, including as far north as North 
Tr¿ndelag, and the Manufacturing Administration made plans for further expansion in 
1778.  As a result, Taxmaster SchimmelmannÕs glassworks opened in Hurum in 1781, prin105 -
cipally to produce bottles. This new enterprise revealed shifting investor motives, especially 
with regard to the localization of the glassworks. As mentioned, all the earlier glassworks had 
been located far from the sea, but close to forests, in order to make easy use of local natural 
resources necessary for the production of glass, principally wood for fuel. Now, in a period of 
increasing demand, however, the speed of transportation to Copenhagen became the primary 
economic and logistical bottleneck for the company. In hindsight at the time, even Carsten 
Anker admitted that locating the glassworks far from the sea had been Òthe most importantÉ 
of the many and significant mistakes made in the establishment of the Norwegian 
glassworks.Ó  According to AnkerÕs new plan, Biri glassworks would be closed and its pro106 -
duction moved to Hurum, which was closer to the sea. And from Hurdal, similarly, crown 
glass production was to be moved to a new glassworksÑalso nearer to the coastÑdedicated 
to the production of fensterglass, crown glass, as well as bottles, which were the companyÕs 
most market sensitive products.  This last idea was not implemented. To compensate for the 107
lack of wood in Hurum, production was originally intended to be based on imported coal, and 
earlier skepticism that production based on coal would be too expensive, not to mention 
counterproductive to the original idea of valorizing domestic raw materials, had seemingly 
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lost out in the calculus of costs.  Such a coal-fueled glassworks was in effect put in opera108 -
tion in Hurum in 1784, but soon proved to be a failure. The quality of the glass was poor, and 
production costs were higher than expected. Most importantly, the boom years were coming 
to an end. While Norwegian glassworks sold bottles for 72,000 Rd in 1781, three years later 
sales value had sunk to 32,000 Rd. The stock of glass grew again, and longer transport times 
would no longer be a problem for the company until the next boom, this time for window 
glass, emerged in the early 1790s. The new glassworks in Hurum were then reopened, only to 
be shuttered yet again once that boom, too, ended.  The entrepreneurs and investors of the 109
Norwegian glassworks learned the costs of organizing according to fluctuating market de-
mands the hard way. Further attempts at running that specific glassworks were abandoned, 
and, when the next boom in demand for Norwegian glass began in 1803, a new wood-fueled 
glassworks inland at Jevne, close to Lillehammer, had been established and made a more sus-
tainable contribution to the industry.  110
Visible and Invisible Hands 
The first ever translation of The Wealth of Nations was into Danish. In 1779, only three years 
after the original publication of Adam SmithÕs masterpiece, the book was officially translated 
and published in Copenhagen.  The majority of the translationÕs subscribers were Norwe111 -
gian, and several of the key persons in the glass administration were among those who initi-
ated and supported the translation.  The book was translated by Frants Dr¾by, who had 112
been private tutor for James ColletÕs family in the Christiania, and he had been persuaded 
into completing it by Carsten Anker and Anders Holt, who both had met Adam Smith in per-
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son in Glasgow during their Grand Tour.  Smith had himself personally recorded the meet113 -
ing in their diary of the journey, in an entry for 20 May 1762: 
I shall always be happy to hear of the welfare and prosperity of three Gentlemen in 
whose Conversation I have had so much pleasure, as in that of the two Messrs. Ancher 
and of their worthy Tutor, Mr Holt.  114
At that time, Holt and Anker were two of the four members of the board of the Norwegian 
Manufacturing Administration, and it is worth asking, after having seen the direct influence 
of ThottÕs ideas on the founding of the Norwegian glass industry, whether SmithÕs ideas simi-
larly might have influenced the sector and its administration in the later eighteenth century. 
 On SmithÕs personal relation with the Anker family as the context for the translation, see Niels Banke, Om 113
Adam Smiths forbindelse med Norge og Danmark (Copenhagen: National¿konomisk Forening, 1955), translated 
by Hans Johansen as ÒOn Adam SmithÕs Connections to Norway and Denmark,Ó in Cheng-Chung Lai (ed.), 
Adam Smith across Nations: Translations and Receptions of The Wealth of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 42-60. See also Geir Thomas Rissen, Eidsvollsbygningen: Carsten Anker og Grunnlovens hus 
(Oslo: N.W. Damm & S¿n, 2005), pp. 14-15.
 Quotation from Adam Smith, reproduced in Rissen, Eidsvollsbygningen, p. 14. For the date, see Carl Jo114 -
hann Anker, Christian Frederik og Carsten Ankers Brevveksling 1814 samt Uddrag af deres Breve fra 1801-13 
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From an organizational standpoint, the state had never been more active in managing 
the glassworks than in the years following 1776. The glassworks were run by a state-owned 
company from 1776 until 1782, when they were incorporated in a new partnership called 
Handels- and kanalkompaniet (the Trade and Canal Company), with a majority of private 
shareholders.  The new company was built on a similar vision to the one that had inspired the 
Norwegian Company in 1737, namely to exploit the countryÕs natural resources. Now, how-
ever, those resources included the new Eider Canal (also known as the Schleswig-Holstein 
Canal) connecting the North Sea to the Baltic. The partnership was to run a variety of com-
mercial and industrial activities in Denmark-Norway at the time, including the glassworks, 
but it was no commercial success. In 1784 the glasswork unit demerged from the company, to 
be run as a state-owned enterprise until 1824.  Already in 1794, however, the state leased 115
out the glassworks again, this time to Hans Wexels, an experienced manager who had re-
placed Carsten Anker as director of the glass industry in the Norwegian Manufacturing Ad-
ministration in 1781, and who then had been made general director of the glass industry in 
the Trade and Canal Company. In 1794, he leased the glassworks for a period of 15 years at 
an annual rate of 8,000 Rd.  116
Though the state in many ways had strengthened its position in the glass industry 
since its incipience, this period of state ownership and private leaseholding would witness the 
introduction of more liberal regulatory reforms and, for the first time in half a century of op-
erations, a turn to profitability as operations became more efficient. If the company continued 
to post yearly losses during the first decade or so following the kingÕs 1776 takeover, it could 
finally report total profits of 3,479 Rd in 1787, no less than 48 years after it was 
incorporated.  This state of affairs would continue uninterrupted for the next 15 years.  117 118
The reasons for the companyÕs sudden profitability were varied. Partly, it was simply the con-
sequence of a technical operation that essentially spun off the old stock of unsold glass as a 
 Hans Chr Johansen, Dansk ¿konomisk politik i rene efter 1784, vol. I: Reformr, 1784-1788 (Aarhus: Uni115 -
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separate entity that would sell directly to markets during periods of high demand, thus remov-
ing the value of this inventory from the original companyÕs accounts.  At the same time, 119
other operational factors contributed to the turnaround. A commission managed by the Danish 
entomologist Johan Zoga was given a mandate to introduce more cost-efficient methods in 
the glass industry in emulation of successful foreign practices, Òsuch as in the German glass-
worksÓ.  The commission furthermore suggested that salaries, which had been comparative120 -
ly high in Norway following wage inflation during the boom years, were to be reduced. As a 
result, following yearly wage-increases of 20-40 percent in the period 1776 to 1783, they 
were now cut by around 50 percent.  The cost of some raw materials were similarly re121 -
duced, and, at the same time, glass prices themselves were increased, by between 10 and 20 
percent in 1783 alone.  122
No less importantly, the companyÕs obligation to produce all types of glass at any one 
time to ensure the domestic supply of Denmark-Norway, a principle that private investors had 
long fought against, now came under attack again. Already in 1772, Morten W¾rn had ar-
gued that it was impossible to be profitable as long as the company had to maintain a full 
stock of glass in so many different cities. His proposal had been to maintain only two in 
Norway, in Christiania and Drammen, and to allow customers to order from the central cata-
logue and from advertisements.  But nothing happened. Indeed, the company further com123 -
mitted itself to also maintaining a warehouse in Copenhagen of such a size that it could cover 
the full demand for glass throughout all of Denmark in 1781.  Only in 1787 would the 124
much-protested institutional constraint of keeping warehouses with stocks of all kinds of 
glass be abolished. According to Hans Wexels, who argued strongly for this reform, the man-
agement of the glass industry ought to be given Òthe freedom to organize the operation ac-
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 Christiansen, De gamle priveligerte norske glassverker, pp. 164ff; Forestilling no 106/1785, FK.121
 Ibid. pp, 187f.122
 M. W¾rn, memo July 15, 1772; FA XXI, 12.123
  Octroj for handels- and kanalkompaniet, #15, printed in Christiansen, De gamle priveligerte norske 124
glassverker.
"45
cording to the demand.Ó  The final change came after the previously mentioned 1787 com125 -
mission had made a new plan for the glass industry. The commission argued that the vast ar-
ray of different glass products that had to be stored should be reduced to a more manageable 
number.  When Hans Wexels began his period as leaseholder in 1794, he could, in short, 126
start almost from scratch with an industry now liberated from some of the most arduous regu-
latory constraints that had shaped the first half-century of its existence. 
Not surprisingly, this new situation of yearly profits, growth, and gradual liberaliza-
tion attracted several interested investors. Among them was, again, Carsten Anker, who in 
1787 made a bid on the entire company on behalf of a group. There were also several com-
petitors to WexelsÕ bid to lease the glassworks in 1793.  Yet, the king did not sell. Why? 127
The Danish Finance Minister Ernst H. Schimmelmann suggested an explanation in 1787: 
ÒIt is beyond all doubt that, if the glassworks could be sold with safety for the capital 
and the continuing manufacture for the countryÕs needs, then it would from all per-
spectives be much more advantageous than either leasing them or trying to run them 
on your majestyÕs account.Ó   128
As long as domestic production would continue, in other words, the state wanted to sell the 
glassworks. It just found the offers too low. Indeed, Wexels had a paragraph included in his 
contract that decreed that he indeed could buy the glassworks if the parties only could agree 
on a price. But, beyond the question of price and the companyÕs underlying value, there was a 
second, regulatory concern that made a sale difficult. For, from the late 1780s, the state was 
increasingly looking to liberalize the industry to encourage its international competitiveness, 
while potential buyers were insisting on maintaining the old privileges and, crucially, the rel-
ative ban on glass imports from 1760. 
Already when the glass company management had negotiated for the import ban in 
1760, then-director Storm had feared that they might be accused of pursuing monopolistic 
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privileges, and that they would be associated with Òthat hated name of monopolium.Ó  In 129
practice, this was, of course, what the industry was awarded, and though more economically-
liberal ideas had driven the private investors interested in acquiring the glassworks from the 
late 1760s, the tables had turned as the glassworks became profitable in the late 1780s. Now 
it was the state that wanted a more liberal regulatory regime, perhaps even under the influ-
ence of SmithÕs recently translated Wealth of Nations, while private interests essentially res-
urrected ThottÕs old arguments for imposing stronger protections for the industry. No less 
ironically, one of the primary champions of liberalization at the time was the glass mastersÕ 
guild in Copenhagen. It officially criticized the glass industry in 1788, claiming that the qual-
ity of the companyÕs goods was poor because of its monopolistic privileges. Additionally, as 
evident from the fine wines and foods that they consumed, it was argued that the glass indus-
tryÕs management lived a life of luxury and corruption because of the rents they were extract-
ing from an overly-regulated market. The managers, a representative of the guild bewailed, 
had gotten their jobs through powerful friends, Òfrom poor people they grew to become capi-
talists, while the country always has losses.Ó  If only privileges were abolished, they main130 -
tained, the price of glass would fall, benefitting both exports and domestic consumers.  131
Regulators listened, and, beginning in the late 1780s, the salaries of the glass industryÕs man-
agers were explicitly linked to the companyÕs profitability, to the point that they would be 
reduced if it failed to turn a profit. Not only that, but, in accordance with the 1787 commit-
teeÕs recommendation, the two directors Wexels and Essendrop both had their fixed salaries 
cut. In exchange, they were given incentives to perform, with a promise of 20 percent of all 
profits as well as a bonus of 1,500 Rd if profits exceeded 3,000 Rd.  132
Far from an idiosyncrasy of the glass industry, these reforms were expressions of the 
stateÕs comprehensive new vision of economic policy, according to which, in the face of the 
high costs of subsidies and the increasing challenge of smuggling, it partly felt forced to lib-
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eralize as a means of improving its financial situation.  This process of liberalization had 133
been planned by the Department of the Treasury for many years. Already in 1787, the Board 
of Trade argued that if the state were to sell the glassworks, it should also have the right to 
abolish the industryÕs protective privileges.  And, when a new period of leasing out the 134
glassworks began in 1793, the state initiated a debate on how Òto achieve the liberation of 
manufactures and trade.Ó  The new lease agreement for the period 1793-1808 stated that 135
that privileges to produce glass would be abolished after 10 years, import restrictions on win-
dow panes after three, and on other types of glass after ten years, which meant that, for the 
last five years of the contract, the Danish-Norwegian glass industry would operate on a prin-
ciple of essentially free international competition. The monopoly was abolished in 1804, after 
which imports were allowed and competing glassworks were built in Norway.   The pur136 -
pose of this gradual experiment was, explicitly, Òto thus achieve, on the basis of experience, 
certainty about whether the glassworks can exist on their own in the future.Ó  The transition 137
to a more ÒliberalÓ political economy was, in other words, not something pushed for by pri-
vate interests, at least not in this case, but rather something carefully planned for by the state 
once the industry at long last had achieved profitability. Indeed, reinforcing the Fabian nature 
of the reforms, the leaseholder received financial support to prepare for the gradual exposure 
to international competition in the form of 8% production subsidies.   138
This is, of course, not to say that new ideas about political economy had not penetrat-
ed the state apparatus, far from it. As contemporary debates in the National Board of Trade 
made clear, questions of economic principles were frequently debated at the highest levels of 
government. A 1794 intervention explained the case plainly, ÒManufacturers who can experi-
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ence progress in the face of competition with foreign factories are far more secure, and build 
on far firmer ground, than those who are shielded by uncertain prohibitions.Ó  The new ori139 -
entation of political economy was, in short, both intellectual and practical in nature. But 
while the government increasingly argued for more liberal principles in the 1790s, private 
interests in the business continued to resist the changing policy orientation. As Smith, after 
all, wrote about such matters, Òpeople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for mer-
riment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices.Ó  Though the phrase frequently is taken to indict all sorts of 140
businesspeople, the first, Danish translation gives a more specific contemporary reading of 
SmithÕs term: Òmanual laborers of a Guild [haandv¾rks-Folk af eet Laug]  seldom come to-
gether even to pass time and enjoy themselves without their gathering ending in a conspiracy 
against the public [Sammenrottelse mod Publikum] or some contrivance to raise prices.Ó  141
Conspiracies, in short, were a problem of guilds, not the pastime of capitalists, investors, and 
entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, Carsten Anker fought against liberal reforms in the sector when 
they proposed to acquire the whole glass industry in 1787, and, when restrictions on imports 
gradually began to be abolished in 1803, the leaseholder Hans Wexels similarly sought to 
stop the process as best he could. His experiences as a leaseholder, he argued, proved that 
Òthese [glass]works are even less able than certain other manufactures to compete with for-
eign glass factories without help, either in the form of premiums for production and export, or 
through prohibitions against the importation of certain kinds of foreign glass.Ó Not only that, 
but why should Denmark-Norway unilaterally liberalize at a time when the great powers of 
the age continued to protect their own domestic glass industries? France, after all, still banned 
glass imports, and England maintained an export premium of 22 percent.  And English ob142 -
 ÒBem¾rkning ved en forhehavende muelig Forandring i det nuv¾rende Fabriksystem 1794,Ó KK div no 889.139
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servers were all too happy to note that the old patterns of trade with Denmark-Norway con-
tinued: Òwhat we import being materials, and our exports manufactured goods.Ó  143
 William Playfair, The Commercial and Political Atlas (London: Stockdale, 1787), pp. 86-88.143
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The consequences the reforms would be dramatic, Wexels warned, and indeed they 
were. In this, and other ways, the early nineteenth century inaugurated a new and very differ-
ent chapter in the history of the Norwegian glass industry. First, the sector was exposed to 
international competition in 1804; then Denmark became an export-market following Nor-
wegian independence in 1814; then, finally, the state sold its shares to private investors in 
1824. The foundational era of one of NorwayÕs most iconic industries was then over, and new 
challenges faced the company as it continued its tumultuous journey towards the present. The 
final privatization of the company was debated at length in the Norwegian Parliament. 
Carsten Anker, then director of the state glassworks and grand old man of the industry, was 
called upon to advise on the matter in 1821. The parliamentary committee continued to con-
sider the industry in light of the larger economy of the country, arguing, for example, that, in 
spite of losses, Òone should not fail to draw attention to the fact that the operation of the 
[glass]works has prevented the loss that would have arisen had one retired all their employees 
and workers.Ó  But Anker himself was reported to have drawn Òa historical account of their 144
state since their establishment,Ó arguing for the necessity of their privatization given present 
conditions. Though he did not mention SmithÕs Wealth of Nations by name in his speech, his 
debts to the book that he had helped translate decades earlier was clear as crystal.  Not only 145
were private entrepreneurs and investors incentivized by their personal stakes in the business 
to work harder and be more successful than salaried state managers, but the committee also 
echoed AnkerÕs warning about continuing State ownership in Parliament saying: 
Òthe State thus becomes manufacturer as well as merchant with these productsÑ
something which is to be advised against from a number of perspectives; first of 
which is that any manufacture is a branch of industry that almost belongs to private 
[interests], and which the State should seek to promote, but not itself become involved 
in, except in the case of the greatest need.Ó   146
 Stortingsforhandlinger. 1821 Vol. 3 Nr. 4 (Christiania: Gr¿ndahl, 1822), 21de Juli 1821, 76-84, p. 76.144
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Parliament approved of the sale, with eleven votes against, but unanimously voted that the 
glassworks should be Òrun at the StateÕs expenseÓ until a high enough price was reached. As 
it happened, Carsten Anker himself would not live to see that day. He passed away while in-
specting the Biri glassworks in 1824, shortly before the industry that he so profoundly influ-
enced was privatized.  147
The Political Economy of Business Enterprise 
ÒThe Norwegian CompanyÓ that, in 1887, became Christiania Glasmagasin represents one of 
the countryÕs first and, eventually, most successful stories of industrialization. It bridged the 
so-called ÒindustriousÓ and ÒindustrialÓ revolutions, and, simultaneously a symptom and a 
driver of an emerging culture of consumption, it expanded hand in hand with what contempo-
raries called Òcommercial societyÓ in Norway.  Neither wholly private, nor entirely public, 148
the company was the product of Danish-Norwegian political economy at the time, and could 
not have succeeded without either the skill and resilience of private enterprise, on the one 
hand, or public protection and policy on the other. At the same time, its origins and history 
were deeply shaped by the unique political but crucially also environmental conditions of 
Denmark-Norway; by the climate, geography, and particular confluence of natural resources 
found there. And the complex dynamics of the Norwegian Company offer a remarkable ex-
ample of how traditional historiographical dichotomies between planning and laissez-faire 
fail to reflect the complexity of the historical record.  Private entrepreneurship and man149 -
agement were necessary for the companyÕs founding, but the agency of its regulation re-
mained resolutely state-centered, whether during the period of monopoly and prohibitions or 
that of free international competition. Liberal reforms were not something that strengthened 
private interests eventually were able to force on a weakening Leviathan state, somehow free-
 Knut Mykland, ÒCarsten Anker,Ó Norsk biografisk leksikon, https://nbl.snl.no/Carsten_Anker 147
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ing themselves from fetters of regulation, quite the opposite. The business never existed out-
side of the sphere of regulation.  150
From this perspective, the question remains why private investors proved willing to 
sustain high yearly losses for almost half a century. At first glance, it is hard to ignore that the 
scenario presented by the Norwegian glassworks in the eighteenth century jibes poorly with 
long-influential theories about entrepreneurs, investment, and indeed capitalism itself. By 
most current understandings of the concept, the investors in the Norwegian glassworks were 
not Òmaximizing shareholder value,Ó certainly not in the short, medium, or, by the measure of 
contemporary life expectancies, the long or even very long terms.  Even accepting that, for 151
decades, they were expecting an import ban that might eventually make the company prof-
itable, it remains thatÑgiven we know that the median age of death in Norway was less than 
40 years in 1770ÑDanish-Norwegian glass investors literally accepted more than a lifetime 
of losses.  As an unlimited liability company, it is hard to argue that the investors were not 152
aware of the losses either, or for that manner were really ignorant of the true financial situa-
tion they were in. The yearly nature of their payments to cover losses means that they either 
willingly took the losses, or were, for a lack of a better term, utterly incompetent. The latter 
explanation seems unsatisfactory given what we know of some of the investors and how they 
made fortunes in other sectors, and this itself may be part of the key. Though 12,000 Rd in 
yearly losses was a veritable fortune in Denmark-Norway at the time, corresponding to the 
value of almost 8,500 barrels of cheap beer in Copenhagen, or 2 million bricks, it paled in 
comparison to the wealth that contemporary investors had accumulated in the timber trade.  153
When Carsten AnkerÕs cousin Bernt Anker, himself an investor in the glassworks from the 
1770s onwards, died as NorwayÕs wealthiest man in 1805, his fortune was estimated at 1.5 
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million Rd.   It may also be that, as the state itself did, investors approached the losses in 154
the specific industry as acceptable because of positive externalities for other sectors in which 
they were involved, in Carsten AnkerÕs case perhaps most evidently the East India Company 
that, as we saw, absorbed considerable quantities of glass bottles for wine export to the small 
Danish colony of Tranquebar. A full picture of the shareholdersÕ financial activities may, 
however, be beyond what the surviving documentary evidence can supply, and it is anyway 
worth remembering that corporations historically frequently were understood to have a wider 
set of duties and responsibilities than mere profit maximization.  The dream of profitability 155
surely kept the glassworks going. Even so, there may also have been non-financial reasons 
for the shareholderÕs willingness to shoulder losses.  
Business historians have recently highlighted the variety of motivations that inspire 
investor activities. As Geoffrey Jones has shown, it can be enlightening to ask how investors 
and entrepreneurs ÒimaginedÓ a world different from the one in which they lived, and why 
they believed that specific business opportunitiesÑin our case glassÑcould help achieve 
it.  Norwegian investors were very much in the activity of Òworld-makingÓ as discussed by 156
Nelson Goodman and Pierre Bourdieu, and this may help triangulate their motivations during 
the eighteenth century.  Throughout the early modern European world, it had become noth157 -
ing less than common sense to equate a state of exporting raw materials to industrial powers 
with a state of de jure or de facto economic colonialism.  From the Kingdom of Naples to 158
the Kingdom of Norway, two of the ÒKingdoms governed as ProvincesÓ in eighteenth-centu-
ry Europe, theorists and practitioners alike increasingly voiced the concern that not only a 
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countryÕs material welfare but also its relative power, independence, and status in in-
ternational relations required policies to ensure the development of domestic manufactures. 
As such, industrial development explicitly became a matter of patriotic pride throughout Eu-
rope, and evidently so in politically and economically subjected regions such as Naples and 
Norway. From the Neapolitan professor Antonio Genovesi to the Molde civil servant Even 
Hammer, the development of domestic manufactures was deemed integral to the patriotic im-
provement of oneÕs country.   159
As Odd Arvid Storsveen and others have argued, the form of Norwegian patriotism 
that emerged in the early modern period was not primarily linked to any claim of political 
independence from Denmark, though writers like Hammer at times did veer into that territo-
ry. Rather, Norwegian patriotism focused principally on the ideal of improving the country, 
and frequently championed private efforts to support the countryÕs interests as a moral imper-
ative.  The impact of Norwegian patriotism on business behavior remains understudied, but 160
we would suggest that, from this perspective, high but, relatively speaking, limited yearly 
losses could well be deemed a worthwhile cost to pay for NorwayÕs economic and reputa-
tional improvement; it represented not only a simultaneously strategic and philanthropic in-
vestment in the countryÕs future but also a translation of financial capital into social and sym-
bolic capital for the individual investor.  As such, the project to Òbuild the country,Ó a 161
phrase that would become synonymous with an overarching narrative of modernization and 
development in later centuries but which existed already during the Enlightenment, can be 
understood to have included not only the foundation of a national universityÑthe Christiania 
patriciateÕs best-known philanthropic project at the timeÑbut also the establishment and de-
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velopment of new industries.  After all, it remains that key figures in the Norwegian glass 162
industry, both as government administrators and private investors, counted among ÒEi-
dsvollsmennene,Ó the Òfounding fathersÓ of national independence who met in Carsten 
Anker's Eidsvoll Manor, north of Oslo, to debate, draft, and sign Norway's constitution be-
tween 10 April and 17 May, 1814.  Across the European world, ideals of improvementÑ163
and eventually independenceÑwere increasingly seen as inseparable from the dynamics of a 
politically segregated yet economically interconnected states-system, and what kinds of in-
dustries a polity hosted were by necessity cardinal questions of business practice and political 
economy alike.  164
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In the latter decades of the eighteenth century, a number of sometimes competing and 
sometimes overlapping politico-economic discourses, languages of more or less equal de-
scriptive and, at least temporarily, persuasive forceÑmercantilist, colonialist, Cameralist, lib-
eral, and so onÑwere available to European statesmen and entrepreneurs alike, and could be 
used to forge, formulate, understand, express, and even conceal their motivations. Amidst this 
overgrown if not hallucinatory terrain, all facile attempts at drawing clear ideological lines or 
neatly matching identities, incentives, and interests are doomed to failure. The case of the 
Norwegian glass industry in the later eighteenth century is full of what might be called, from 
the formative business perspective of our own time, mismatches: investors and entrepreneurs 
willing to accept decades of losses, guilds in favor of liberalization, a king voluntarily abne-
gating his own historical prerogatives. How, ultimately, can we make sense of these mis-
matches? Much business thinking today privileges the short-term at the expense of the long-
term; that much is obvious.  And from a historical and comparative perspective, the very 165
time scales we now use to think about firms, competitiveness, and profitability tend to be rad-
ically foreshortened. In trying to understand the pastÑand in trying to conceive of a future 
better than one we are livingÑwe can profit from a careful dilation of the time scale, from a 
long-termness but a fluid long-termness. Adagio, as the musical notation has it, ma non trop-
po.  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